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The success or failure of community strategies to address the youth gun violence crisis is often 
attributed in part to how well the problem is understood and diagnosed.1 With support from The New 
York Community Trust, the Crime Commission has undertaken an analysis of youth gun violence and 
crew activity – violent turf rivalries among less-organized, smaller and normally younger groups than 
traditional gangs – in select New York City communities. Our initial findings from available data, existing 
research, and interviews with stakeholders are presented in a series of papers titled, “Assessing New 
York City’s Youth Gun Violence Crisis: Crews”.
This research and fieldwork demonstrated that crews – and not traditional, hierarchical gangs – are a major part of violent 
crime statistics and analysis. Crews actually account for a great deal of youth criminal activity, especially violent crime– 
and without proper interventions for this type of activity, we will not be able to adequately address what has been a 
persistent public safety and criminal justice issue for New York City.
In order to develop more effective responses to crews it is essential for stakeholders to acknowledge 
the victimization of those involved, understand their underlying needs, and identify the neighborhood 
conditions that impact them.
ExECUTIVE SUmmARY
New York City has famously experienced unprecedented, sustained reductions in crime over the last 25 years.2 
Areas once so dangerous that they resembled foreign war zones now are home to some of the most desirable real 
estate in the country. We proudly and rightfully point to our success, calling ourselves the “safest big city in America”.3 
But there are places and people that have been left behind. There are areas which have not seen violent crime rates drop 
to nearly zero – as others have – or anywhere close. Certain races and age groups are also still far more likely to become 
victims and be responsible for violent crime than others.
The root causes of violent crime have not changed either—and the circumstances under which crime is committed sound 
eerily familiar to the high-crime New York of 25 years ago that we now refer to as the “bad old days”. Therefore, in order 
to make real strides in improving the quality of life amongst these persistently hardest-hit groups, we must address the 
root causes of why youth become involved in gun violence and crews.
The NYPD publically acknowledged that youth “gangs” are becoming more organized and more violent,4 finding that 
more than a third of all shootings in New York City now involve what the NYPD calls “crews”.5  In order to truly identify 
how youth are involved in organized activity (gangs, crews, etc.) and gun violence, the Crime Commission researched 
legal and intelligence definitions and conducted fieldwork with community residents, service providers, and policymakers 
which revealed three broad categories of organization:
TRADITIONAL GANGS 
Groups that have clear hierarchy, 
structure, organization, rules of 
conduct and are profit-motivated, 
usually affiliating with national 
gangs such as the Bloods.
CREWS i
Fluid groups formed based on where 
members live, such as a building or 
block, creating violent turf rivalries. 
Crews generally do not have clear 
hierarchy, structure, or rules, and are 
usually not profit-motivated. 
GROUPS 
Unorganized groups, often tem-
poral in nature, which form as a 
result of interpersonal conflicts. 
i. Crews form working relationships with other crews, known as sets. Sometimes crew members also affiliate with a citywide set (Young Guns (YG) or Young Bosses (YB))  
   for recognition when traveling outside of their neighborhood.
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• Elected Officials
• Government Agencies 
• Advocates 
• Philanthropies  
WRAP-AROUND SERVICES
• Legal 
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• Youth Engaged in  
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Although there have been significant recent investments by policymakers and funders – ranging from 
organizing task forces and work groups, to deploying new law enforcement strategies, to implementing 
programmatic interventions – New York City’s ability to fully understand and diagnose its crew problem 
is hindered by a lack of data and coordination.
While the NYPD collects data on crew members and related criminal activity, law enforcement data are typically 
insufficient to inform comprehensive responses because it is collected for the purpose of informing suppression and 
investigation strategies.6 At the same time, community-based organizations collect a range of data about the underlying 
needs of the individuals involved, but often lack the capacity to analyze and communicate these data to inform policy 
and programming decisions. Further, the City lacks a collaborative effort among stakeholders dedicated to addressing 
this problem.
Preventing crew violence cannot be accomplished by a single agency or organization. Effective solutions require the 
combination of insight, hard work, and dedication from a wide variety of organizations and stakeholders. New York City 
should immediately mobilize stakeholders to take steps toward developing a comprehensive strategy to address the 
city’s crew violence problem.
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THE CRIME COMMISSION’S ASSESSMENT OFFERS THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS: 
IMPLEMENT A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH:
• Deliver and sustain adequate services to prevent crew violence.
• Develop funding strategies that promote stability and consistent service delivery, and thus situate providers 
in a position to succeed.
• Better track the risks, needs, victimizations, and activities of youth involved in crews, as well as the conditions 
impacting them by harnessing the wealth of knowledge possessed by stakeholders.
• Facilitate a collaborative effort among stakeholders to minimize the duplication of efforts and maximize the use of 
resources available to selected needs.
BETTER COLLECT AND SHARE DATA:
• Share aggregated data on crews between government agencies and citizens.
• Request the NYPD to report crew-related crimes as part the Mayor’s Management Report and/or weekly 
CompStat reports.
• Create information-sharing forums both within and across stakeholder groups (e.g., government, community-
based organizations, youth) in order to share insights and identify effective prevention and intervention 
strategies.
• Build the capacity of community-based organizations.
• Support must be provided to community-based organizations for internal capacity building by instituting 
a civilian CompStat-like data management system for violence prevention programs.
• Strengthen inter-organization collaboration to facilitate the integration of resources and responses.
COORDINATE A CONTINUUM OF INTERVENTIONS:
• Incorporate programs that have different points of contact with youth at each developmental milestone.
• Government must invest in locally accessible interventions that focus on education and vocational skills, 
address victimization, trauma and grief, and emphasize the role of the family and community.
As youth develop their identity, set goals, and plan for their future they stop committing crime.7 
By implementing these suggestions, the city can build comprehensive strategies that reduce 
crew violence and make our communities safer.8
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Defining the extent of New York City’s crew problem, creating a system for 
analyzing it, and devising effective interventions are only helpful if services to 
prevent violence are delivered and sustained. Yet there is inadequate support 
from the government and the private sector for organizations that actually 
provide the services that get results—and a lack of coordination amongst the 
organizations themselves. 
We know that crew violence has been of increasing concern among 
residents and policymakers in New York City. Research shows that there are 
fundamental differences between youth and adults that engage in crime. 
In response, over the last several years, policymakers and funders have 
made significant investments. Responses ranged from organizing task 
forces and work groupsi, to deploying new law enforcement strategiesii, to 
implementing programmatic interventionsiii (see exhibit 1). These responses 
are already proving successful, with historically high-crime neighborhoods 
like Central Harlem seeing dramatic reductions in murders and shootings.1 
With many of these interventions 
already in operation and more being 
implemented, we must ensure they 
are situated in a position to succeed. They must be sponsored and available to 
all high-risk youth to yield the best results. If these elements are not in place, 
communities endure tragic results: organizations report increases in shootings 
and violence when budget and resource cuts require them to scale back services.2  
When combining all of these efforts into a comprehensive strategy, ensuring 
continuity of services should be at the core of responding to the problem— 
a response that must be rooted in community partnerships.
Preventing crew violence cannot be accomplished by a single agency—effective 
solutions require the combination of insight, hard work, and dedication from a 
wide variety of organizations and stakeholders. Therefore, strengthening inter-
organization collaboration is necessary to facilitate the integration of resources 
and responses. By building partnerships and sharing information communities can 
increase their capacity to develop, implement, and assess strategies to prevent 
violence among youth3 (see exhibit 2).
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EXHIBIT 1: 
Programmatic Interventions 
•	 Street	Outreach
•	 Violence	Interruption
•	 Conflict	Mediation
•	 Hospital	Responders
•	 Educational	Workshops
•	 Community	Mobilization
•	 Public	Education
•	 Youth	Development		
(talent shows; sports; after-school 
activities)
•	 Peer	Leadership
•	Wrap-Around	Services		
(legal; education; job readiness  
& training; mental health;  
substance use)EXHIBIT 2: 
Elements of Effective  
Continuums
•	 Collaboration
•	 Locally	Accessible	
Services
•	 Access	to	Youth	and	
Creation	of	Portals		
into	Services
•	 Assessing	Needs
•	 Managing	Referrals
•	 Building	and	Maintaining	
Trust
•	 Sustainable	Long-Term	
Funding
•	 Clearly	Defined	Roles
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i. The Crime Commission’s Youth Violence Prevention Work Group, New York City Council’s Gun Violence Task Force
ii. NYPD’s Operation Crew Cut
iii. Operation SNUG, NYC Young Men’s Initiative
iv. See volume I of series “Defining the Problem: Crews and Gun Violence”
The following is a detailed assessment of the target population, effective programs 
and interventions that already exist, and what is necessary to create a successful and 
comprehensive continuum of services to help high-risk youth leave a life of violence behind.
TARGET POPULATION: YOUTH ENGAGED IN CREWS & VIOLENCE
Researchers have found that criminal offending increases during the teenage years, peaking at about age 17 (slightly 
younger for nonviolent crimes and slightly older for violent crimes).4 Despite the frequency of crimes committed by 
individual youths during adolescence, research has consistently shown a dramatic decrease in the number of crimes 
committed after adolescence.5 Thus, youth who engage in criminal activity, including violence, are not necessarily on the 
track to become repeat adult offenders.6 In fact, only a small percentage (approximately 5-10%) of youth who engage 
in crime become chronic offenders, continuing criminal activity into adulthood, because youth are highly responsive to 
interventions.7
This period of increased criminal activity is often attributed to the cognitive and psychosocial developmental changes 
that occur during adolescence, which make youth more vulnerable to external influence, more impulsive, and less self-
disciplined.8 With this combination of factors present in youth, it is not surprising that researchers have found that most 
delinquent behavior is a group activity.9
Developing a peer group is an important and healthy process in every youth’s development, as it provides youth with 
a reference point for developing a sense of identity.10 Adolescence is the first time in the developmental process when 
a person possesses the cognitive capacity to sort through who they are and what makes them unique. This process 
involves testing methods on how to cope with stress, manage emotions, and relate to others.11 As youth seek to 
define their self-concept, self-worth, and identity, they utilize a trial and error approach experimenting with different 
appearances, behaviors, and peer groups.12 Often, youth who end up engaging in crews have struggled during this 
stage of development, and, as a result, have developed maladapted techniques to cope and connect with others. Youth 
who remain in crews for longer periods than others typically share personality and behavior traits with other members, 
“including aggressiveness, oppositional behavior, inattentiveness, hyperactivity, and maintaining relationships with 
antisocial peers.” 13
While we know not all peer groups engage in criminal activity and groups that do engage in criminal activity are not 
all considered crewsiv, it is important to understand the contextual factors that influence cognitive and psychosocial 
development (including family and community factors). Crews are more prevalent in communities where there are high 
levels of poverty and crime, and where educational and vocational opportunities are limited. Such community conditions 
can create antisocial community norms (i.e., rationalizations for crime and drug use, negative attitude towards the law). 
These factors combined with youth who feel unsafe in their communities contribute to a positive view of crews and 
normalization of violence.14 
In sum, youth involved in crews have unique reasons for joining, which are affected by cognitive and psychosocial 
developmental changes and environmental factors (such as family, neighborhood, school, and peers, among others).15 
Youth exhibit a wide range of symptoms and needs,16 and require individualized responses to their unique needs and 
circumstances.17
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CURRENT PROGRAMMATIC RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM
Generally, the programmatic responses implemented to prevent and intervene in violence seek to address risk factors 
including: antisocial personality patterns; procriminal attitudes; social supports for crime; substance use; poor family 
and marital relationships; low performance/satisfaction at school and work; and lack of involvement in prosocial 
recreational activities.18 Given this broad range of factors to address, programmatic interventions are implemented in 
a variety of settings including in schools and in the community. By utilizing multiple settings, interventions are able to 
reach both youth involved in violence and the broader community, as well as target factors at various developmental 
stages. For example, some violence prevention programs meet disconnected youth on the street, whereas school-based 
interventions access youth enrolled in school, and community development organizations have contact with a broad 
range of youth.  
To address the above risk factors, organizations throughout New York City have adopted 
various program components that seek to engage youth at varying stages in their development. 
Common elements and goals include:
Street Outreach
Participant outreach is performed on the street, aiming to recruit youth engaged in shootings seeking out both victims 
and shooters (as youth involved in violence often fall into both categories). Street Outreach is strengthened by employing 
credible messengersv who have “lived the life” as outreach workers. Based on their life experience, a Street Outreach 
Worker (OW) can genuinely tell youth “I have been there and you don’t have to do this.” This gives them credibility and 
facilitates trust between the OW and the youth. This also provides the OW the opportunity to identify the participant’s 
underlying needs and problematic thoughts that heighten their risk for violence, and then the OW can provide 
alternative solutions to stressful situations and connect the youth to the appropriate services to help them become a 
healthy, productive, and contributing citizen.19 Ultimately, Street Outreach seeks to facilitate behavior modeling through 
the use of mentors and also seeks to connect youth to needed services.
Violence Interruption
Public health approaches view violence as a disease, treating it as a behavior that is a learned response which is modeled 
and copied.20 Often one shooting leads to another, creating a cycle of continued violence and further perpetuates a 
casual attitude toward violence.21 Therefore, if one incident can be diffused there will not be grounds for retaliation, 
thus breaking the cycle of violence related to that conflict.22 Programs utilize a combination of violence interruption and 
conflict mediation to disrupt fights and diffuse conflicts. Since behaviors are learned, staff encourage youth to consider a 
broad range of responses to a situation, especially as much of this violence is based on small disrespects to one’s character 
or reputation, such as looking at someone’s girlfriend or being on the wrong side of a block. Violence Interrupters (VI) 
are deployed to the streets at night to look for situations that might produce violence and when violence occurs, they 
literally step in-between the groups in conflict.23 These VIs are also credible messengers who have influence over people 
in the community. The employment of credible messengers as VIs facilitates the ability to maintain awareness of and 
stop any impending violence. The purpose of this strategy is to provide on-the-spot alternatives to violence to cool-
down conflicts, and to provide youth with the skills to respond to and deescalate conflicts.24 These decision alternatives 
are often negotiated, situation-specific, tangible options for youth involved in a conflict. For example, staff may ridicule 
the stupidity of gun violence to resolve trivial matters, promote truces, negotiate payment of fines, or as a last resort, 
encourage youth to use physical violence instead of using a gun.25
v. For the purposes of the anti-violence interventions, a “credible messenger” is someone with street credibility, is respected in the community, and has influence over people 
    engaging in violence.
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Conflict Mediation
Conflict mediation seeks to resolve arguments and disputes that may lead to violence, and reconcile conflicts that have 
lingered after a fight or violent act has occurred. Conflict mediation brings people in conflict together to resolve the 
dispute through mutually acceptable agreements. This process is facilitated by an impartial party, which creates a forum 
where both sides can be heard. These efforts also provide youth with the skills they need to respond to and deescalate 
conflicts of all kinds. Conflict mediation is implemented in multiple settings (including in schools or on the street as part 
of violence interruption).26 
Hospital Responders
In efforts to stop retaliation, programs deploy Responders to hospitals to provide support and conflict mediation to 
victims of penetrating trauma such as stabbings, shootings, and severe beatings. The Hospital Responders are also 
credible messengers that aim to engage the victim, as well as family and friends, and at times the perpetrator in the 
emergency room.27 This component is crucial as often family and friends are emotional after a loved one has been 
attacked, which can lead to violent retaliation. Upon connecting with the victim, the Hospital Responder will assess 
the likelihood of retaliation and provide the victim with referrals to resources such as an Outreach Worker, shelter, 
counseling, legal services, and more.28
Educational Workshops
Educational workshops aim to provide youth with information, tools, and skills to troubleshoot everyday situations and 
resolve conflicts peacefully. Workshops are often facilitated by credible messengers, and may cover topics such as 
gangs and crews, anger management, bullying, interpersonal teen violence, obesity, digital storytelling, HIV/AIDS and 
STD awareness, and drug abuse.29
Community Mobilization
Community mobilization is a common public health strategy that involves residents, local businesses, elected officials, 
clergy, and community groups to promote prosocial norms.30 Social norms are the beliefs, attitudes, and values that 
make up the culture of a community, defining what behavior is and is not acceptable.31 This strategy aims to encourage a 
discussion around what is and what is not acceptable concerning violence in a community.32 Anti-violence organizations 
mobilize the community by holding marches, rallies, community talks, and vigils in the community where they seek to 
spread the message of “stop the shooting” to the wider community.33 Within 48 hours of a shooting, the community is 
mobilized. Staff go door-to-door spreading the word about the shooting and the needed response from the community. 
These efforts are made to display the community’s outrage to such a horrible event, reinforce community norms against 
violence, and remind individuals that they can take positive, collective action against crime in their community.34 
Public Education
Public education is used as a method to change norms, to increase awareness of the emotional and financial costs of 
violence to individuals and the community, and to increase awareness of available programs and services. Staff distribute 
materials—flyers, posters, buttons, key chains—in large volumes when canvassing the catchment area, mobilizing the 
community for a shooting response, and during the actual response itself.35
Youth Development: Talent Shows, Sports, and After-School Activities
Youth development recreational activities seek to increase opportunities for youth to interact in a prosocial setting. 
These activities can also be used as a means to decrease tensions among youth. For example, basketball and other 
sports tournaments are set up to bring rival youth together to humanize the other side and create new opportunities for 
positive experiences with each other. Talent shows promote youths’ abilities and simultaneously engage the community 
in a positive event, providing the opportunity to educate the community about current anti-violence efforts and how 
they can get involved.36 These events supplement after-school programs, where youth are engaged in prosocial activities 
on a daily basis. Recreational activities focus on youths’ strengths instead of their negative risk factors, giving the chance 
for participants to feel they have something positive to offer to the community.  Research consistently demonstrates that 
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prosocial activities reduce the amount of time youth have to engage in deviant behaviors, promote health-enhancing 
behaviors, such as physical activity, diet, sleep, and safety practices, and provide the structure youth need for positive 
development.37 
Peer Leadership
Peer leaders serve a variety of functions, such as role models, personal support, resource agents, and learning coaches.38 
Youth are provided the tools they need to become peer leaders through trainings in areas such as group facilitation, 
advocacy, public speaking, critical thinking, and conflict resolution. These skills allow them to promote anti-violence 
norms in peer interactions and workshops for other youth. Peer leaders are typically recruited from various backgrounds, 
including those involved in violence and those that are not, in order to maximize their reach. This facilitates the dissem-
ination of information across a broader audience of youth. Further, engaging youth that are involved in violence as peer 
leaders creates an opportunity for them to become highly invested and involved in their community, and positions them 
to gain meaningful educational and personal benefits, including an enhanced sense of belonging in a prosocial group.39
Wrap-Around Services
In efforts to meet youth needs holistically, service providers have included program components that are not solely 
anti-violence mechanisms but aim to serve the underlying needs of youth involved in crews and violence. Wrap-around 
services are also implemented to serve family members and the family as a whole.
•	 Legal: This component aims to assist families and youth navigate legal issues and provide support by coordinating 
needed government services. Examples of legal services include criminal defense, immigration, education and 
housing issues (including safety transfers), know your rights training, and advice on how to handle encounters with 
law enforcement  (including encounters prompted by shooting investigations).40   
•	 Education: Many youth engaged in crews are not in school and may have learning disabilities. As employment is 
known to decrease criminal behavior, acquiring education is an important step towards employment opportunities 
and away from crime. Programs offer tutoring and educational programming to help youth return to school or 
acquire a high school equivalency diploma.
•	 Job	Readiness	&	Training: Youth involved in violence typically have a range of barriers to employment, including 
criminal records and/or limited employment experience. In order to prepare youth for meaningful and long-term 
employment, programs teach soft skills (e.g., communication, enthusiasm/attitude, teamwork, networking, problem 
solving/critical thinking, timeliness)41 and provide youth with opportunities for vocational skills training, education, 
and literacy support.42  
•	 Mental	Health: Providing access to mental health services for youth is critically important because the first signs 
of many mental illnesses begin to appear during the teenage years.43 In addition, witnessing or being the victim 
of violence at home or in the community can be traumatic, create symptoms (e.g., problems sleeping, anxiety, 
aggression), and exacerbate existing mental illness.44 Moreover, delayed or untreated mental illness can lead to more 
severe illness, requiring higher levels of treatment and care.45 The goal of providing mental health services to victims, 
shooters, and friends and families affected by violence is to provide preventative care and coping skills.46
•	 Substance	Use: Substance use is often a driver of violence and a barrier to employment. For example, youth may 
commit robberies to obtain money for drugs. In addition, many companies require drug testing as a condition of 
employment. Drug rehabilitation services seek to both reduce crime and reduce barriers to employment. 
Each intervention plays an important role in preventing violence and is necessary to create 
multiple points of contact at which programs can access youth at varying stages of development.
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• Youth Engaged in  
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• Peers
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• Community Members 
CHART 1: CONTINUUM OF SERVICES
COORDINATING A CONTINUUM OF SERVICES
The above programmatic efforts to prevent and intervene in violence are implemented by numerous stakeholders and 
all of their expertise and hard work is valuable and needed.47 Each stakeholder serves an important role in addressing 
this problem and therefore should be viewed as part of a continuum of interventions. Coordinating an effective and 
efficient continuum of services requires incorporating stakeholders that have different points of contact with youth at 
each developmental milestone.48 This is especially important as longitudinal studies repeatedly show problem behaviors 
change in form and function over the course of adolescence.49 For example, youth who identify with deviant peer groups 
often present symptoms (e.g., aggression, anxiety, depression, delinquency, risk-taking) during early adolescence, which 
lead to adaptive failures, exacerbating their symptoms and antisocial behaviors.50 Moreover, it is suggested that crew 
involvement is by far the most harmful developmental milestone in the escalation of problem behavior into violence.51 
For this reason, stakeholders from a variety of settings need to inform decision-making and work together to deliver the 
best services and policies for youth. 
By organizing interventions along a continuum, stakeholders can contribute their knowledge 
and point of view in a broader context, facilitating a better understanding of the problem. 
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ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE CONTINUUMS
As stakeholders and organizations seek to create a continuum of services, in addition to resources such as staff, time, 
and expertise, to be effective they need: a positive attitude toward collaboration; locally accessible services; processes 
to access youth, assess their needs, and manage referrals; strategies to build and maintain trust with their clients; 
sustainable long-term funding; and clearly defined roles.52 Decision-makers should support partnership and network 
building activities and prioritize these elements in policy and program development efforts. 
Collaboration
Among organizations and stakeholders working to prevent and intervene in violence, collaboration is essential because it 
increases the ability to improve the lives of youth more efficiently and effectively. When organizations across and within 
fields work together to meet goals, the benefits are numerous, including increased communication, more informed 
programming and policymaking, maximized resources and influence, and shared responsibility. Moreover, collaboration 
can help to minimize the duplication of services, opening up resources for additional efforts and services.53
Locally Accessible Services
Community-based organizations providing services to youth engaged in violence regularly report the need for services 
to be present in the community, as crew-involved youth cannot safely travel within their community due to territory 
rivalries in the surrounding blocks of their homes. To illustrate the severity of this situation, one organization reported 
a youth from a particular housing development would not go to the pizzeria on the corner, even if paid one hundred 
dollars, because it is located in rival territory and consequences would surely be carried out for such a visible act of 
disrespect. In addition to the rivalries, public transportation is often inadequate—youth report having to take multiple 
buses and/or subway trains, traveling one-and-a-half to two hours to get to service providers. The combination of these 
factors creates significant barriers to receiving services. To overcome these obstacles, wrap-around service providers 
aiming to meet this population’s needs should either send staff to or open offices in high-need communities. Service 
providers outside the community can create partnerships with community-based organizations to share resources, such 
as office space and referrals, to meet a common goal of serving the same population. This collaboration and local access 
to services will ultimately provide youth the opportunity to receive the primary essential services they need to develop 
and obtain the foundation level skills necessary to be healthy, productive, contributing citizens. 
Access to Youth and Creation of Portals into Services 
Bringing services to the community is especially helpful as violence prevention programs seek to reach disconnected 
youth who other institutions have trouble accessing. The employment of credible messengers who live in the 
community facilitates unique access to this population. Although the organizations that use this strategy are 
effective at reaching this population, they often do not have the capacity to provide all of the additional wrap-
around services in-house to meet participants’ needs. For example, most youth involved in crews have multiple 
presenting needs and symptoms, ranging from homelessness to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).54 
By including these organizations in a continuum of services, they could serve as an entryway or portal into other services, 
such as mental health, substance use, legal, housing, employment, and education. Therefore, building partnerships and 
networks would enhance these organizations’ abilities to meet youth needs more holistically. 
Assessing Needs
In order for service providers to develop meaningful partnerships and networks, they must first understand the needs 
of the population they aim to serve. To enhance service providers’ abilities to coordinate services, program staff often 
need case management, clinical, and other relevant training to help identify participants’ needs and appropriate referral 
options. Staff can then apply this knowledge to the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data collected. As service 
providers build upon their data collection and analysis capacitiesvi their abilities to identify and communicate youth 
needs and trends will be increased, allowing them to build partnerships and networks with appropriate service providers, 
meet additional youth needs, maximize resources, and ultimately improve program performance. 
vi. See volume II of series “CompStat For Violence Prevention Programs”
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Managing Referrals
In order for community-based organizations to create a sustainable network, they must maintain a referral process. 
This will allow them to collect the specific information they need for additional service providers, coordinate appoint-
ments for youth, ensure follow-up occurs, and receive feedback from youth and providers on the quality and appro-
priateness of referrals. Further, maintaining a specific protocol for making a referral will help build professional rela-
tionships between agencies, as the structure will provide consistency and ease the exchange of information between 
organizations.55 It is important to factor in that each organization along the continuum will learn about youths’ needs in 
different ways. For example, some organizations might implement a thorough intake process during the initial phase of 
enrollment, while others may learn about needs over time. Regardless of when information is acquired, staff should be 
able to consult a protocol and easily refer youth to the needed services throughout their participation in the program. 
Referral protocols should include any qualifying information required from each service provider.56 For example, mental 
health service providers usually have eligibility criteria, which participants must meet to qualify for a specific program 
or service. This information is especially important for organizations that are working with violent youth, as a history of 
violence is an exclusionary criterion for some services. In order to make appropriate referrals, staff should have access 
to the eligibility criteria for each service provider in the organization’s network.57 Further, staff should be able to track 
the status of referrals, including denials of service, accepted service, re-referrals, and process-oriented obstacles or 
ameliorations (such as why a participant didn’t show up for an appointment and any communication between the case 
manager and the service provider to resolve any issues).58 These data will allow community-based organizations the 
ability to analyze which service providers best serve their participants and which processes are essential to achieving 
successful referrals to services. 
Building and Maintaining Trust
The target population has acquired several labels—“high-risk,” “hard to reach,” “disconnected,” among others—because 
these youth are often considered extremely difficult to serve from an organization’s perspective, as often the youth are 
not seeking services for themselves and have a hard time engaging in services consistently.59 This is often due to mistrust 
built up over the course of the youth’s life as a result of people and institutions disappointing them again and again. 
This distrust makes engaging youth a difficult task for service providers. However, there are strategies to overcome this 
obstacle. Showing consistency and accessibility by employing credible messengers and bringing services to the local 
community can demonstrate to youth the organization’s commitment to engaging them in meaningful services. It is 
important to note that once a community-based organization has earned a youth’s trust, it is imperative to maintain it, 
because once trust is lost, it is very difficult to regain. 
Sustainable Long-Term Funding
Trust is jeopardized or broken when services and/or resources are cut. For example, if a program loses funding and 
can no longer operate in a community, the youth participants do not understand the complex world of funding and 
government, and may internalize this loss and view it as another rejection, which can exacerbate problem behaviors and 
symptoms. Many organizations report that at one time or another they have been required to shut down operations, 
shrink their catchment area, or roll-back services due to funding cuts. Devastatingly, they often report an outbreak of 
violence immediately after the reduction of services, underscoring the importance and the impact of their presence in 
the community. 
Further, unstable funding places added stress on staff and can put them in a difficult situation. For example, youth will 
continue to reach out to staff for assistance, resources, and support after the program has been downsized or the youth 
is no longer living in the catchment area. This requires the staff person to decide to either volunteer their limited time 
and energy to continue to serve the youth or to detach from the youth they have built a relationship with and hope the 
youth finds another connection elsewhere.
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While funding gaps lead to disappointment, they also disrupt services for youth in need. This is very problematic, 
especially as more and more organizations implement evidence-based programming that requires the right dosage of 
intervention without interruption to produce expected results. Therefore, policymakers and funders should be mindful 
of how funding strategies impact program delivery. For example, organizations are often granted seed money to get the 
program started, but some lack the capacity to raise long-term funds to keep the program running. In other scenarios, 
organizations that are successful in reducing shootings and killings in their communities may become ineligible for funding 
because the number of incidents no longer meet the required thresholds set by funders. Due to the complexities of crew 
violence, short-term reductions in violence do not necessarily correlate to sustained reductions; therefore, organizations 
should continue to receive funding to maintain the peace and expand services until long-term trends reveal they are no 
longer needed. For these reasons, it is essential to strategize on how money is invested and also consider investing in 
organizational development and/or capacity building technical assistance to help organizations build internal capacity 
to acquire sustainable long-term funding. 
Clearly Defined Roles
With so many organizations providing services to high-risk youth, and limited resources to go around, it is important to 
clearly define the roles of each organization along the continuum. This will help to mitigate the feelings of competition 
and also help organizations to communicate their value added. New York City has the opportunity to create a 
comprehensive continuum of services to address this problem. Moreover, by coordinating these services and defining 
each organization’s role, we can relieve the impression that organizations need to develop solutions on their own. This 
will minimize the duplication of services, help to more accurately measure the impact of interventions, and maximize the 
dollars invested in such interventions. Most importantly, this will allow organizations to focus their efforts on where they 
are most effective, rather than struggling to provide services to meet every need and competing for grants in unfamiliar 
territory to make ends meet. Ultimately, this coordination of services will create specialized organizations with in-depth 
knowledge and practice on how to approach and solve specific problems, leading to genuine and legitimate change 
among youth and communities affected by violence. 
CONCLUSION
As youth develop their identity, set goals, and plan for their future, they stop committing crime.60 New York City is 
fortunate to have many effective programs and interventions already in existence that can help youth get them there. 
What is needed now is a unified effort among portals, wrap-around services, and policymakers to create an effective 
continuum of services to better serve the target population. By investing in interventions that focus on education and 
vocational skills, strengthening bonds to conventional social groups, emphasizing the role of the family and community, 
and coordinating the community-based organizations that provide these services, we can create comprehensive 
strategies that reduce violence and make our communities safer.61
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